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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(j) as a transfer
from the Utah Supreme Court.

The judgment being appealed has

been certified as a final judgment by the trial court pursuant to
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(See Order Dismissing

Case as to Defendants Woolsey, Record, pp. 188, 191.)
ISSUES
Whether or not the District Court was correct in
granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and alternatively granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that an
individual property owner can have no liability to a neighboring
property owner for actions taken in compliance with zoning
setback regulations as applied by the governmental entity
pertaining to the real property in question.
Defendants do not dispute the standard of review set
forth in Plaintiffs' Brief for the issue presented by this case;
i.e., that the standard of review for both an order of dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) and summary judgment under Rule 56(b) is one
of correctness, with the Appellate Court granting no deference to
the trial court.

Stokes v. VanWaqgoner, 987 P. 2d 602 (Utah,

1999) and Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah, 1989) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a case in which Plaintiffs filed suit against
Defendants seeking alleged damages in the amount of at least
-6-

$100,000.00, also seeking an injunction ordering that Defendants'
home be dismantled and removed, and further seeking alleged
damages based on fraud.
This is a case involving a dispute arising from the
placement of Defendants' home on their subdivision lot located
South Weber City, Davis County, Utah.

m

Plaintiffs contend that

the home was placed too close to their common boundary line and
within a setback area.

Defendants respond, stating that they

worked closely with South Weber City Building Department; that
the City approved everything that was done as far as placement of
the home on the lot and construction of the home.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiffs filed suit in Second District Court on or
about July 28, 2003.

Record, p.l.

Defendants then filed a

Motion to Dismiss based on Rule 12(b) (6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure together with a Memorandum in Support.
and 95.

Record, pp. 8 9

A hearing was held on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on

March 3, 2004, at which time, the District Court granted
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and, m
Motion for Summary Judgment.

the alternative, as a

Record, pp. 188.

Between the filing of Defendants' Motion to DJsmiss and
the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs added
another Defendant; i.e., South Weber City, pursuant to Court
Order dated October 28, 2003.

Record, p. 117.

Statement of Facts
The parties hereto both own adjoining properties m
-7-

a

subdivision known as Cedar Bench Phase 10, located in South Weber
City, Davis County, Utah.

Record, p. 3.

In the spring of 2003,

Defendants (Woolseys) obtained a building permit to construct a
home on their lot.

Record, p. 67.

Defendant Woolseys' lot is

located in a cul-de-sac, is odd-shaped; i.e., five-sided (four
sides with a radius curve at the front), Record, p. 67.

Based on

the dimensions of the lot, space would not accommodate a
standard-size home; i.e., the lot is long and narrow.

Record,

pp. 67 and 68.
Based on the unusual configuration and dimensions of
the lot, City ordinances pertaining to the placement of a home on
such lot allow for some leeway to accommodate the building of a
home on such lot.

Record, p. 68.

Defendants' lot is similar to a corner lot on a radius
corner.

The ordinances of South Weber City allow the designation

of one of the two rear yards of Defendants' lot to be designated
as a side yard.
building.

Such designation allows for an adequate area for

Record, pp. 67-72.
Defendants placed their home in a manner consistent

with South Weber City's instructions.

Record, pp. 68 and 72.

Defendants' home as presently situated is approximately 16 feet
from the boundary line in common with Plaintiffs' property and
well within the ten-foot side yard setback requirement.

Record,

pp. 6 8 and 69.
The ordinance requirement of a 3 0-foot rear setback for
the line of Defendants' lot designated as the back yard, or rear
-8-

yard, was sufficiently met and approved by the South Weber City
Building Inspector.

Record, pp. 6 9 and 72.

Defendants' home is no higher than 32 feet high, well
within the maximum structure height allowed by the City
ordinance, which allows a maximum height of 3 5 feet.

Record, p.

69.
According to the South Weber City Building Inspector,
Defendants are in full compliance with all ordinances and
requirements that apply to the construction and placement of
their home on Defendants' property.

Record, pp. 6 9 and 70.

Beginning April 2003, Defendants began constructing
their home on their property.

Record, p. 2.

Approximately three plus months after Defendants began
construction of their home and after substantial construction
activities had occurred, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against
Defendants to halt construction and require removal of
Defendants' home.

Record, pp. 1-5.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to restrain Defendants
from occupying their home, which Motion was heard and denied on
December 5, 2003.

Record, p. 155.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was heard on Mairch 3,
2004.
The District Court granted Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and alternatively granted Summary Judgment in favor of
Defendants..

Record, pp. 188-191.

District Court's Order of Dismissal.
-9-

Plaintiffs then appealed the
Record, p. 192.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants argue that the South Weber City Building
Inspector who issued a building permit to Defendants and
authorized placement of Defendants' home on Defendants'
subdivision lot did so in a reasonable manner that was not
arbitrary or capricious and in a way that was supported by
substantial evidence.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs were well aware
of the fact that Defendants were building a home for the reason
that it was located immediately adjacent to their lot.

Any time

after the building permit was issued, and such became apparent by
the construction activity on the lot, Plaintiffs could have
pursued the administrative remedy of appealing the building
inspector's decision to issue a building permit to the South
Weber City Board of Adjustment.

The Utah Code Ann. precludes the

pursuit of a District Court challenge until such administrative
remedy has been exhausted.

For that reason alone, this case

should be dismissed.
Defendants also argue that significant deference should
be applied to municipal land use decisions.

That unless such

decisions are arbitrary, capricious or illegal, such decisions
should be upheld, and that such decisions are not arbitrary or
capricious if they are supported by substantial evidence, which
was considered by the South Weber City Building Inspector prior
to the issuance of the building permit to Defendants.
Defendants also argue that the claim of nuisance by
-10-

Plaintiffs is untenable.

All of the cases presented in support

of Plaintiffs' nuisance argument are cases dealing with physical
invasion onto or into the real property of the claimant.

There

is no allegation of physical invasion of any kind in this case;
therefore, Plaintiffs' claim of nuisance should be dismissed.
Finally, Defendants argue that the Affidavit of Kerwin
L. Jensen submitted by Plaintiffs does not diminish Plaintiffs'
duties as set forth above nor bolster Plaintiffs' position in any
way.

Addressing issues pertaining to zoning decisions is a

function entirely within the discretion of the city.

Though Mr.

Jensen may have a differing opinion, his opinion is irrelevant.
The decision by South Weber City's building inspector was an
appropriate decision.

The District Court's recognition through

its Order of Dismissal and Grant of Summary Judgment should be
upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN
RULING THAT AN INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY OWNER CAN HAVE
NO LIABILITY TO A NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNER FOR
ACTIONS TAKEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH ZONING SETBACK
REGULATIONS AS APPLIED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY
PERTAINING TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN QUESTION.

The trial court ruled that an individual property owner
should have no liability to a neighbor for actions taken in
compliance with zoning setback regulations required by the
governmental entity.

Record, pp. 189-191.

Even taking the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint
as true as required in a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, such facts are
irrelevant if Defendants simply followed the law, particularly in
-11-

light of the fact that Plaintiffs did nothing to stop the
construction of Defendants' home until the home was nearly
completed.
A. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES.
A Board of County Commissioners is "...empowered to
delegate the issuance or denial of such (building) permits to a
county building inspector, or 'may authorize an administrative
official of the county to assume the functions of such position
in addition to his customary functions'....The Board of
Adjustment is also empowered to hear an appeal from any
individual seeking to set aside the decision of any
administrative official or body relating to the zoning
resolution."

Thurston v. Cache County, et al., 626 P.2d 440, 445

(Utah, 1981).
" (1) No person may challenge in District Court a
municipality's land use decisions made under this
chapter or under the regulation made under authority of
this chapter until that person has exhausted his
administrative remedies."
" (2a) Any person adversely affected by any decision
made in the exercise of or in violation of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of the decision with the District Court within
30 days after the local decision is rendered...." Utah
Code Ann. Section 10-9-1001, "Appeals".
The above-referenced Code section as set forth in the
Utah Municipal Code, Chapter 9, entitled "Municipal Land Use
Development and Management", sets forth the procedure by which a
person aggrieved by a decision made pursuant to the land use
regulations of the Utah Code may take action.
-12-

Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-703 grants power to the
Board of Adjustment to hear and decide "...appeals from zoning
decisions applying to zoning ordinance...."

Plaintiffs admit

that Defendants began constructing their home in April 2003.
Record, p. 2.

Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed until at least

July 28, 2003 (as indicated by the date on the Complaint) .
Record, p. 5.

At the time Plaintiffs' filed their Complaint,

they acknowledged that Defendants' home was significantly
constructed as follows:
"7. The rear wall of the home is located approximately
12 feet from the rear lot line of Lot 153.
"8. Construction of the home has caused the home to
rise approximately 40 feet into the air....
"10. Many windows which have been cut in the home
being constructed on Lot 153 look directly down into
the back yard of Lot 155, owned by Plaintiffs."
(Plaintiffs' Complaint, Record, p. 2.)
It is clear that the Plaintiffs were well aware of the
structure being built on property adjacent to Plaintiffs'
property, but they did nothing to address their concerns or
attempt to stop construction thereof.
The Code clearly provides for a remedy; i.e., to appeal
to the Board of Adjustment regarding zoning decisions (Utah Code
Ann. Section 10-9-703) and, in fact, no challenge in a District
Court may be made until the person has exhausted his
administrative remedies (i.e., appeal to the Board of Adjustment)
(Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-1001) .
The District Court's Order dismissing this matter
should be upheld if for no other reason than because Plaintiffs
-13-

have prematurely filed a Complaint in District Court.
B. MUNICIPAL LAND USE DECISIONS ARE ENTITLED TO A
GREAT DEAL OF DEFERENCE.
".

Because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a

property owner's common law right to unrestricted use of his or
her property, provisions therein restrict Ann property uses should
be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses
should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner,"
Patterson v, Utah County Board of Adjustment, 8 9 3 I .1d ' i'^, *, o6
(Utah App . , 1905 K

Because there Is a reasonable interpretation

of the South Weber City Ordinances that was made by the South
Weber City Building Inspect err :.i n this case,

which was based on

the facts and evidence presented to the building inspector, the
granting of the building permit and the pl.acem.ent of Defendants'
home as placed were reasonable decisions.
Pursuant to statute, "...(3) The court shall:

(a)

presume that land use decisions and regulations1 are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious or illegal

ll

Tit ah Code Ann. Section 2 0-9-1001

also, Bradley v. Payson City Corporation,
200~- > ' illations omitted^ .

See

\ > I , .- < J 0 1, 5 0 i Lit ah,

Furthermore, "When a ] and use

decision is made as an exercise of administrative or quasi
judicial powers...we have held that

SITOJ

iecisnons are not

arbitrary and capricious if they are supported by 'substantial
evidence' . '"'' Id. , at: 0.1 (citations omitted) .
The evidence to support the land use decision, in
question is set forth in the Affidavit, of Mark Larsen, the South
-14-

Weber City Building Inspector who granted the building permit in
this case.

The evidence supporting Mr. Larsen's grant of the

building permit is as follows:
"...5...The Defendants' lot located in a cul-de-sac is
an odd-shaped, five-sided lot; i.e., four sides and a
radius curve at the front....Due to the dimensions of
the lot, the space would not accommodate a standardsize home; i.e., the lot is long and narrow....
"7. That Defendants' lot is, in some respects, similar
to a corner lot on a radius corner. South Weber
Ordinances allow designation of one of the rear yards
to be designated as a side yard to allow for an
adequate area for building.
(See Addendum to South
Weber City Ordinances attached hereto as Exhibit "A",
particularly referencing the sketch labeled 'radius
corner lot', which is similar to the Defendant's lot.)
"8. That Defendants' home is presently situated on
their lot in a manner consistent with Affiant's
understanding of South Weber City's relevant
ordinances....
"9. That the ordinance requirement of a 30-foot rear
setback [Section 10-5A-4(c)(3)] was sufficiently met as
noted in the attached drawing. Two sides of the
Defendants' lot were approved by Affiant for side yard
setback requirements of a minimum of 10 feet on each
side. Such placement by Defendants' home on their lot
was approved by Affiant. The front setback of 3 0 feet
was met and the rear setback of 3 0 feet was met on the
northwestern side of Defendants' property.
"11. That Affiant has personally measured trie height
of the Defendants' home, and it extends from grade no
higher than 32 feet, well within the maximum structure
height allowed by the City ordinance (Section 10-5A-6)
which allows a maximum height of 35 feet.
"12. That Affiant has been made aware of the dispute
between the parties to this lawsuit and has personally
inspected the home and verified the placement of the
home in relation to the boundary lines of the property.
"13. That Defendants are in full compliance with all
ordinances and requirements of South Weber City that
apply to construction and placement of their home on
the subject lot." Record, pp. 67-72.
-15-

The South Weber City Building Inspector's decision to
issue a building pernnv

w^,ci maie i or leasons set forth above.

Due to the unusual nature of the lot; i.e., long, narrow, and
five-sided as opposed to a standard, four-sid^d, square <vr
rectangular-shape:! "Mt , the building inspector determined one of
the property lines to be the rear line, one of the lines to be
the front line, and two of the lines 1~o V^j t Iv- side \ arcl lines.
Hi" decision i r, issue a Duilding permit and to allow placement of
the home on Defendants' lot in its current configuration was notarbitrary nor capricious and was made only ciftei a thorough
le^l&v*

duo uii trie substantial evidence as set forth in Mr.

Larsen's Affidavit.
Plaintiffs' reliance on lhe Harper case is misplaced.
Plaintiffs state that in Harper,, "...both the municipality and
the landowner were named as defendants in a nuisance acta on, even
though the landowner had simply relied on the actions of the
municipality in approving the contested use of the 1 and."
(Plaintiff's Brief, }

L' . )

Thou g h :i t. :i 11 \; r\.\ c 1. h a t 1. he

municipality ant Llie landowner were both named as defendants,
after significant activity at the District Court level and t he
Court of Appeals, the Utah Fupi erne Court; 1. m a l l y stated as its
coneI usion a s foilows:
"In sum.,, we reverse summary judgment on the development
code claim and instruct the Court of Appeals to remand
to the trial court with instructions to determine
whethei: the facility is, in fact, an accessory use and
thus authorized under the development code. We vacate
the Order of Removal (of the building). We affirm the
Court of Appeals' reversal of a nuisance per se finding
and vacate the jury award based on. it. We affirm the
-16-

reversal of summary judgment on Harper's due process
claim and affirm the denial of fees under 42 USC
Section 1988, and finally we affirm the Court of
Appeals' reversal of summary judgment on the open
meetings claim and vacate the award of attorney's fees
made for its violation and affirm the Court of Appeals'
reversal of the trial court's denial of the Motion to
Dismiss, effectively dismissing the cause of action for
failure to state a claim upon which relief car. be
granted." Harper v. Summit County, 26 P.3d 193, 201
(Utah, 2001).
Therefore, other than to remand the case to the trial
court to determine whether the facility constructed was an
accessory use under the zoning ordinance, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed every order, finding, and award that had been made in
favor of the landowner who had filed the lawsuit.

If anything,

the Harper case favors the position of Defendants herein.

The

court in the Harper case stated earlier that "...the issuance of
certificates of zoning compliance and building permits is an
administrative action to be performed by the zoning administrator
(or his or her representative) and by the building inspector
respectively."

Id., p. 201.

Such is what occurred in this case;

i.e., after a thorough review and based on the evidence available
to him, the building inspector of South Weber City issued a
building permit, allowing Defendants herein to construct their
home.
II.

THERE WAS NO NUISANCE COMMITTED BY DEFENDANTS.

Plaintiffs allege that they have sustained private
nuisance damages as a result of the placement of Defendants' home
and because it has been constructed at too great a height.
Record, pp. 156-159.

Defendants dispute that a nuisance of any
-17-

kind has been created.
Th^ definition of :,i private nuisance is "

a

substantial and unreasonable and nontrespassory interference with
the private use and enjoyment of another's land."

llanf ord v .

University of U:ah, 4r,8 r . l,d 141, 144 a1 tail, 19 71 J.
All of the cases cited by Plaintiffs deal with physical
invasion of property.

The Sanford case i :\i t ed supra) dealt with

"i iwl.-j.ini Cor damages resulting from the flow of surface waters
from a University of Utah construction project onto Sanford's
property.
The Turnbaugh case, 739 P.2d 939 (Utah App., 1990),
cited by P] aintiffs involved a claim, by a survi vi rig spouse ol fin
operator nf" -\ front -ord loader against the owner of the front-end
loader and the owner of mineral interests to recover for the
death of her husband when the front-end loader rod led ii ito an
open pit excavation.
In the Branch case, 657 P.2d 2 67 (Utah, 19 82) cited by
Plaintiffs, the property7 owners sued for damages for pollution to
their culinary water wells caused by a percolation of the
defendant's formation waters (wastewaters from oil wells
containing various cherni cal oontarninaj 1 s) intu the subterranean
water system that feeds the wells.
All of the nuisance claims cited by Plaintiffs are for
a physical invasion onh > th^ pi operty of the claimant.
Plaintiffs have not alleged a physical invasion of any kind.
As the District Court in this case stated:
-18-

"There apparently is no Utah case law that either
disposes of the issues herein or even assists in
addressing the issues herein...." (See paragraph 9 of
District Court's Order dismissing case as to Defendants
Woolsey, Record, p 190.)
III.

THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE

Plaintiffs cite to an affidavit by an alleged expert,
Kerwm L. Jensen, apparently m

an attempt to put "facts"

m

dispute.

Though Mr. Jensen in his affidavit claims to be an

expert m

planning and zoning and is apparently currently

employed as such by the City of Montrose, Colorado, Mr. Jensen's
opinion is irrelevant.

Municipalities in Utah are allowed to

establish and interpret rules and declarations pertaining to
their zoning ordinances.

Municipal land use decisions as a whole

are generally entitled to a great deal of deference.
supra, p. 50.

Bradley,

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has stated

that "though a municipality may have a myriad of competing
choices before it [pertaining to zoning decisions], 'the
selection of one method of solving the problem m

preference to

another is entirely within the discretion of the [cityl; and is
not m

and of itself evidence of an abuse of discretion "

Bradley, supra, p. 54.
The City's authorized representative, its building
inspector, made the decision to allow placement of Defendants'
home on their lot in a particular manner.

Such decision was not

a "de facto variance" of applicable zoning rules as alleged by
Plaintiffs, but was a reasonable decision based on the evidence.
The same principles that apply to determining the reai yard line
-19-

of a corner lot on a radius corner do, in fact, apply r *' vhis
lot.

To declare th- entile1 m y t h side of Defendants' lot a rear

yard would in essence make the lot unbuildable in a way not to
allow accommodation for a standard-size home.

iParagraph 5,

Larsen Affidavit , 1 ecoid, p. 6 7.)
The Defendants simply complied with the zoning and
building rules as dictated by Sj'it I1 h»ehei City's building
inspector.

Defendants did nothing wrong or improper.

The

existing case law supports the actions of the South Weber
Building Inspector

in this case, even accepting the facts set

forth in Plaintiffs' complaint.

The Court's grant of dismissal

and/or summary judgment was proper in this case.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request that the District
Court's Order of Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment in favor of
Defendants be upheld; and that Plaintiffs' Appeal be dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^jZ^day of August, 2nfu}

^
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iROBfeRT L. FRC3ERER
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellees

ADDENDUM
No addendum is necesssary.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Robert L. Froei er, hereby certify that the /pjyv day
of Aagusty. 2004, 1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to:
Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
P. 0. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Kraig J. Powell, Esq.
Tesch Law Offices, P.C.
314 Main Street, Suite 2 01.
P. 0. Box 33 90
Park ci ty, Utah 84060-3390
David L. Church, Esq.
Blaisdell and Church
5995 South Redwood Rd.
Salt Lake City, UT 84123

ROBERT L. FROERER
Attorney for Defendants/
Appell ees
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